On June 25, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued one of the most consequential decisions in pesticide litigation in decades. In a 7-2 ruling in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, the Court sided with Bayer/Monsanto, holding that federal pesticide law preempts state-law “failure to warn” claims related to product labels.
For the tens of thousands of people who have filed lawsuits alleging that Roundup caused their cancer (and for the countless more who allege harm from other agricultural chemicals like paraquat, atrazine, and chlorpyrifos), the implications are significant.
To understand what this ruling really means, Pedram Esfandiary, a partner at Wisner Baum with extensive experience litigating pesticide and toxic tort cases, explains what consumers and plaintiffs need to know.
The Background: Durnell v. Monsanto Co.
The case that reached the Supreme Court originated with John Durnell, a Missouri farmer who used Roundup products for approximately 20 years. Durnell developed non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) and sued Monsanto (now Bayer), arguing the company failed to warn him about the potential cancer risks associated with glyphosate — Roundup's active ingredient.
In 2023, a state jury sided with Durnell and awarded him $1.25 million. Monsanto appealed, arguing that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the federal law governing pesticide labeling, preempts state-law claims.
Bayer's core argument: since the EPA approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning, no state lawsuit could hold the company liable for failing to include one. The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this argument in 2025, but the Supreme Court ultimately reversed that decision.
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Brett Kavanaugh held that FIFRA “expressly preempts” state failure-to-warn claims that would require labeling “in addition to or different from” what the EPA has required. Justices Ketanji Brown Jackson and Neil Gorsuch dissented.
Wisner Baum Attorney Pedram Esfandiary – Pesticide Lawsuits Can Still Proceed
To better understand what the SCOTUS ruling means (and what it does not mean), Wisner Baum attorney Pedram Esfandiary answers some questions about the decision. This Q&A is excerpted from an interview Esfandiary gave to KXAN.
Q: What did the Supreme Court actually decide in the Durnell case?
A: It'll be easier to start by explaining what the decision does not mean. It does not mean that a manufacturer — a pesticide manufacturer, for example — is free from all liability when their product causes harm, whether that's cancer, Parkinson's, or another serious condition.
What the ruling simply means, in a nutshell, is that you cannot pursue claims against a pesticide manufacturer based on the label.
In other words, if a product causes cancer, you cannot sue the manufacturer and say, “You should have warned me on the label that there's a cancer risk associated with this product,” if the EPA has previously approved that label without such a warning. You cannot sue a manufacturer because they failed to put a cancer warning on the label. That's the full scope of what this ruling means.
Q: There were already billions of dollars paid out and thousands of cases pending. What happens to those cases now?
A: Cases that are already going forward in courts across the country — and those that are part of a settlement program — will continue. It just means that, specifically, the “failure to warn” claim — the argument that the company failed to warn consumers on the label about a cancer risk — that particular part of a claim will no longer proceed.
However, there are numerous other claims available. Defect claims — such as a failure to safely design the product — are still very much alive and can go forward. The ruling is very narrow. It only applies to this specific issue: Can you hold a manufacturer liable for not including a health warning on a label that the EPA approved without one? It does not wipe out all avenues of litigation.
Q: Some argue that if the EPA approved the label, that should be the final standard. What's your response?
A: The argument sounds reasonable on the surface — who has more knowledge of a product than the regulators who review it? But that logic falls apart when you examine the history. We've seen in the past that manufacturer influence on health regulators has affected those regulators' ability to design labels that are accurate and make sense.
With Roundup, specifically, we have demonstrated that internal company studies showing a cancer risk existed before the EPA approved a label without a cancer warning. Those studies directly informed — or should have informed — the label, but they didn't.
This ruling essentially shields manufacturers and removes the incentive for them to ensure their labels reflect the most updated science they internally know to be true. If we just leave it up to regulators, and manufacturers are best positioned to know the risks associated with their own product, then why aren't they required to disclose that to consumers? The fox got into the henhouse — manufacturers are no longer incentivized to be proactive about warning accuracy.
Q: What was the Supreme Court's primary reasoning for ruling the way they did?
A: Ultimately, this was a business decision. The Supreme Court was wary of placing too much litigation risk on manufacturers and making it harder to bring products to market. The underlying philosophy is that we live in a modern world where some degree of risk is unavoidable — and that manufacturers shouldn't face so many legal consequences that it prevents them from getting products to farmers and consumers.
The Court wanted to shield manufacturers, to some extent, from claims that arise when their labels are found to be misleading. The thinking is: if a regulator has approved the label, the manufacturer should be protected from state tort claims.
Q: So, is this fundamentally a pro-business ruling at the expense of consumers?
A: I think the incentive behind this ruling is business protection, which is unfortunate, because it comes at the direct detriment of states' abilities to enforce their own laws against manufacturers when those manufacturers failed to warn consumers in their jurisdictions.
What's particularly noteworthy is that the ruling came from both liberal and conservative sides of the bench. Typically, conservative justices are very sensitive to preserving states' rights and their ability to enforce their own laws and regulations — especially around consumer warnings. Yet here, seven justices joined together to limit that power. That's telling. When you see that kind of cross-ideological alignment, it usually reflects a deeply held institutional concern — in this case, protecting the regulatory primacy of the EPA over a patchwork of state-level standards.
What This Means for Future Roundup Cases
The practical impact is significant. Bayer previously settled thousands of Roundup cases in 2020 for roughly $10.9 billion (our firm helped negotiate these settlements). The company also announced earlier this year that it negotiated a settlement fund for current and future Roundup claims, and it has indicated it will honor that program.
A Missouri state court has scheduled the final approval hearing for that settlement for September 14, 2026. Since the Durnell ruling, the settlement administrator has also been handling requests from people who previously opted out and now want to rejoin, a likely sign of how much the decision has changed the calculus for Roundup claimants.
As for the many thousands of still unresolved claims, the SCOTUS ruling narrows what allegations can proceed. The “failure to warn” theory has historically been the most successful pathway for Roundup plaintiffs. While removing that avenue doesn't end all litigation, it raises the bar. Remaining plaintiffs will need to rely on product design defect claims or other theories, which are generally more difficult to prove.
For future cases, the ruling largely forecloses new failure to warn lawsuits over any pesticide whose EPA-approved label does not include the disputed warning. It is not just about Roundup; this has wide-ranging implications for the pesticide industry as a whole.
The Dissent Worth Reading
Justice Jackson's dissent, joined by Justice Gorsuch, deserves attention. She argued that the majority “misunderstands FIFRA's requirements, misinterprets the scope of FIFRA's preemption, and ultimately leaves Durnell without a remedy for the significant harms he has suffered.”
Jackson noted that FIFRA itself provides no compensation mechanism for people injured by pesticides, meaning state courts have historically been the only venue where injured families could recover damages. By foreclosing state failure-to-warn claims, the Court has eliminated a critical safety valve, one that served as an accountability backstop when federal regulation falls short.
The Bottom Line
The Durnell ruling is narrow in its legal scope but broad in its real-world consequences. It does not end pesticide litigation altogether, and it does not immunize manufacturers from all forms of liability. But by federally preempting failure-to-warn claims, the Court has handed a major victory to chemical manufacturers and significantly limited the legal tools available to people who have been harmed by pesticide exposure.
For those considering a claim against a pesticide manufacturer, the path forward still exists — but it requires a different legal strategy.
Wisner Baum continues to represent clients in pesticide-related litigation and remains committed to holding manufacturers accountable through every available legal avenue. If you sprayed atrazine, chlorpyrifos, or paraquat and suffered harm, you may qualify for a case. Contact us today or call (310) 207-3233 for a free case evaluation.
